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Although the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has exhibited substantial progress over the past 
40 years in improving primary schooling, marked variations in these achievements are evident within the 
region. This is an interesting puzzle if we recognize the MENA region is highly homogeneous in terms of 
religion, politics and socio-economic structure.  We argue that in this paper, differences in state capacity–
the degree to which MENA states attains desired primary education goals–contribute to these variations. 
To substantiate our argument, we applied different state capacity indicators and tested their impacts on 
primary schooling for the period 1971–2014.  Empirical findings largely support our observations and 
results still hold with alternative indicators and model specifications. These findings have policy and 
academic implications for the study of state capacity, primary education and the MENA region. 
 





Among the United Nations’ (UN) Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) was a statement that all 
primary school-aged children should be able to finish a “full course of primary schooling” by 2015 
(United Nations[UN], 2016, p. 24). The MDGs raised the questions of why primary education cannot 
be ignored. First, scholars, such as Brown and Hunter (2004); Glewwe (1996); Psacharopoulos and 
Patrinos (2004) agree that primary education has the highest (economic) return on investment 
compared to secondary and tertiary education, particularly in developing and less-developed states. 
Second, primary education is a public service, the outcome of which can be evaluated directly by 
assessing whether those who need it actually receive this service (Assaad, Salehi-Isfahani, & Hendy, 
2015; Brown & Hunter, 2004; Thyne, 2006, p. 736). Third, achieving universal primary education is the 
goal of many international organizations and governments (Thyne, 2006; UN, 2016). For these 
reasons, MDGs have focused on primary education. Likewise, we find that emphasizing primary 
education is merited, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.1 
                                                            
1 We follow the division of developing regions of the World Bank, namely Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia and 
Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, and South Asia 
(World Bank 2018c). There is no universally accepted definition of MENA. Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and 
Tunisia are five political entities widely recognized by international and national agencies as North African 
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Regarding the goal of achieving universal primary education, the MENA region has performed 
moderately well overall. In some cases, it has fared even better than most other areas defined by 
the World Bank (2018b). The MENA region made the third greatest progress toward net primary 
education enrolment rate growth (a 23.07% increase from 69.44% during 1976–2014) among all 
regions worldwide (See Figure A1 in the Appendix). Compared to other developing regions, where 
states exhibited either high or low performance in educational attainment, the MENA region is 
notably unique in that it is highly homogeneous in three dimensions: Mostly Islamic, natural 
resources as the dominant economic sector (Ross, 2008; Sachs & Warner, 2001), and authoritarian 
regimes (Freedom House, 2017) among others. 
Despite those similarities and qualified schooling performances, MENA states exhibit different 
levels of primary school enrolment and persistence at the national level. For example, Qatar, which 
once had the highest net primary education enrolment rate in 1971 in the region (out of 11 available 
countries), was ranked fourth lowest of 17 states in 2014. Figure for Morocco has more than 
doubled.  In most years since 1987, data for the United Arab Emirates (UAE) fluctuated between 
85% and 90%. Primary school completion rates varied widely, ranging from 55.27% (Djibouti) to 
108.28% (Algeria) in 2012 (World Bank, 2018b).2 
This raises the question of how we can explain these variations and why some MENA 
countries performed well in primary education while others did not. Due to the region’s overall 
homogeneity, this paper looks beyond the conventional determinants of primary school enrolment 
and persistence rates, such as socioeconomic factors, households, school characteristics 
(Boissiere, 2004; Chaudhary, 2009; El-Sanabary, 1989; Glewwe, Hanushek, Humpage, & Ravina, 
2011; Grigoli & Sbrana, 2013; Zhao & Glewwe, 2010), and international assistance (d’Aiglepierre & 
Wagner, 2013; Dreher, Nunnenkamp, & Thiele, 2008). Instead, in this paper we argue that state 
capacity is more fundamental than these factors in determining primary schooling in MENA.  
Scholars have long discussed about how state capacity shapes positively various 
development issues (see Literature Review below).  We follow a similar line of argument, proposing 
that the variations of state capacity explains why some MENA states perform better educationally 
while others do not.  To be more specific, to promote educational performance, MENA states with 
stronger state capacity tend to better reach their populations, eliminate forces unfavourable to 
education, and allocate and spend education resources. To support our argument, we applied 
alternative state capacity measures and tested their impacts on a series of primary education 
indicators for the period 1971—2014. Results support our observations, and these results hold with 
different state capacity measures and model specifications.  
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we offer a review of the literature on how 
state capacity affects social, economic, and political development, as well as education. We then in 
Section 3 develop our argument. Sections 4 and 5 conduct, present and discusses empirical 
analyses. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. State Capacity, National Development and Primary Education in MENA 
 
Previous research has demonstrated the efficacy of state capacity for handling social, political, and 
economic challenges. Overall, states with stronger capacity are better able to formulate, implement, 
and organize forces and resources for certain development goals. They can also handle domestic 
                                                                                                                                                                  
states. In addition to these five states, the World Bank (2018d) adds Djibouti, and the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR 2016) includes Western Sahara and Mauritania, but excludes Djibouti. 
The U.S. Energy Information Administration (USEIA 2016) has Sudan and South Sudan. In this paper, we cover 
all political entities mentioned by these agencies, and add Turkey and Cyprus (Europa Publications Various 
years) due to their geographical proximity, regional affiliation, and cultural similarity. This yields 26 states and 
political entities. See Table A1 in the Appendix for a complete list.   
2 Figure A2 in the Appendix provides further information on these variations in net enrolment and completion 
rates in primary education across MENA states from 1971 to 2014 (or the earliest and latest years for which 
data are available (World Bank 2018b).   
E-ISSN 2240-0524 
ISSN 2239-978X 
Journal of Educational and  
Social Research 
                             Vol 9 No 3 
                     September 2019 
 
 41 
opposition forces that intend to trigger or escalate rebellion. In such situations, the general rationale 
of the findings of previous research is that a stronger state can reach its citizens by providing them 
with public goods to ease their grievances toward the government (Benson & Kugler, 1998; Fearon 
& Laitin, 2003; Thyne, 2006). 
Stronger state capacity can also address issues, such as fertility rates and sanitation, and can 
assist economically disadvantaged areas in fulfilling development goals. Gizelis (2009) examined 
the impact of state capacity on HIV/AIDS, and found that higher state capacity strengthens the 
ability of governments to change and shape human behaviour, promote prevention programs, and 
absorbs short-term political costs when implementing long-term health promotion policies. Similarly, 
Boussalis, Nelson and Swaminathan (2012) examined the incidence of malaria in India. Their 
findings indicate that incidences of malaria tend to be higher in rice-producing regions, but can be 
contained when higher government capacity enables the improvement of irrigation systems. 
Some research in this field examines the link between state capacity and economic 
performance (Knutsen, 2013; Arbetman & Kugler, 1997, Part II). Feng and Chen (1997) identified 
how variability in state capacity functioned as a signal of macro-political uncertainty in 40 less-
developed states, and deterred private investment. Leblang (1997) argued that government is 
critical when an economy begins to expand. Knutsen (2013) discussed the individual and 
complementary effects of democracy and state capacity on economic development. Finally, 
Bockstette, Chanda and Putterman (2002) explored whether states with a longer history of state-
level institutions exhibit favourable economic performance. Empirical findings confirm that they do. 
Additionally, scholars have found that stronger state capacity is associated with improved 
environmental performance and disaster management. Ward and his colleagues (Ward, Cao, & 
Mukherjee, 2014; Cao & Ward, 2015) observed that, overall, state capacity strengthens 
environmental public goods across regime types. In both democratic and authoritarian states, 
governing elites tend to offer both infrastructural and environmental public goods to their people. 
Similarly, Lin (2015) found that stronger state capacity improves management of natural disasters, 
particularly in democratic regimes. 
With regard to education, some studies have been conducted on state capacity and education 
and a positive connection conforming to the aforementioned observations can also be found. Hanson 
and Sigman (2013); Hanson (2015)’s main argument regarding state capacity is that, provided state 
capacity is sufficiently strong, there is no need for rulers to provide educational services to the public, 
because effective bureaucracy can do so automatically. Knutsen (2013) reported similar results 
derived from using the gross primary education enrolment ratio as a public service indicator. His 
findings support the argument that stronger state capacity contributes to higher enrolment ratios 
worldwide. Furthermore, Mok (2007, p. 6) observed how the state changed from being a “market 
constructor” to a “market facilitator” has enabled East Asian states in the age of globalization to adjust 
their roles in higher education, and increase their efforts toward achieving educational reform. 
We follow the similar line of argument to propose that MENA states with stronger state 
capacity tend to perform well in primary schooling. In general, a politically capable MENA state 
tends to better reach its population, eliminate forces unfavourable to primary schooling, and more 
efficiently allocate and spend education resources. Let us explain each in turn. 
Firstly, MENA states with stronger state capacity tend to provide greater access to primary 
schooling due to their ability to reach their populations. Despite its high homogeneity, the MENA 
region exhibits several vastly different characteristics across states. Geographically, the MENA 
region has political entities that are characterized by mountainous terrain in over a quarter of their 
respective territories, as well as states that are majority desert. Moreover, it includes states with a 
population density of over 500 people/km2, and others, in which fewer than four people reside in 
the same land unit (World Bank, 2018b). 
MENA states that lack capacity may not be able to offer primary schooling to all children 
because they cannot reach all the citizens within their territory. Sudan is a typical example. 
According to the Fragile State Index (FSI) (Messner et al., 2016), Sudan is one of the world’s 
weakest states. Nomadic groups exhibit the lowest primary school enrolment rates compared to 
rural and urban children. In 4 out of 15 administrative regions (Blue Nile, Gadarif, Kassala, and 
Sinnar), almost none (nearly 100%) of the nomadic children attend school (The United Nations 
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Children’s Fund[UNICEF], 2014, p. 33–34, Figure 2.8). Uneven distribution of primary school 
enrolment rates marks the government’s inability to provide public services to children. 
Additionally, household registration systems are a critical factor for educational attainment, 
particularly in narrowing rural-urban educational inequality (Wu, 2011; Wu & Treiman, 2004). Strong 
registration systems rely greatly on the specific mechanisms of capable governments, such as 
creating incentives, imposing penalties to parents, and eliminating forces unfavourable to such 
processes. A strong state can overcome the various obstacles to complete population censuses. 
For example, focusing on birth registration rates is critical for predicting population censuses, and is 
highly related to primary school enrolment. Governments cannot determine how many school-aged 
children are out of school without comprehensive and thoroughly enforced registration. Yemen is 
the most severe case in the MENA region, with approximately 17% of children unregistered at birth 
(UNICEF, 2013, p. 17). This low registration rate explains why its primary schooling performs 
largely worse than its neighbouring states. 
Moreover, stronger state capacity can improve primary schooling by eliminating forces 
unfavourable to primary education, such as poverty, political instability, child labour and gender 
inequality.  The literature reviewed in the beginning of this Section has confirmed that stronger state 
capacity is positively associated with better economic well-being and political stability.  In MENA, 
child labour is also a serious issue. Within this region child labour (as a percentage of all children) 
could range from 8.4% to 15% or higher (International Labour Organization[ILO], 2013, 2016; 
UNICEF, 2016). These figures are only lower than world’s poorest region, sub-Saharan Africa.   
Gender inequality is also another critical issue in MENA, as has been repeatedly confirmed 
(World Bank, 2018b; Kelly & Breslin, 2010; Ross, 2008). Kelly (2010, p. 1–2) states that “It is, 
however, in the MENA region that the gap between the rights of men and those of women has been 
the most visible and severe.” Ross (2008, 2012, Chapter 4) noted an indirect link between gender 
status and education: Higher female labour force participation encourages female school enrolment 
and raises the literacy rates of women; if females are able to raise household income, families tend 
to invest more in their education (Ross, 2008, p. 107). However, women in the MENA region are 
underrepresented in the workforce due to the oil-centric economic structure. This can lead to girls 
being deprived of their education rights and their chances to finish primary school courses. 
A politically capable MENA state may prevent children from leaving schools and penalize 
parents and employers who force children to work beyond their hour limits if child labour is legal (such 
as in the entertainment industry). Additionally, while a natural resource-based economy as argued by 
Ross (2008, 2012) is correlated with lower female labour force participation and investment in female 
education, scholarly evidence has proven that state capacity are better able to promote gender 
equality and empower women (Horowitz, 2009; Htun & Weldon, 2010).3 In Kuwait, women are now 
able to work at the Ministry of Justice (Human Rights Watch, 2012). Bahrain has also started 
diversifying its economic structure before its oil reserves are exhausted (Giddens, 2011, p. 217–218). 
These steps will further improve primary schooling and lower dropout rates among girls. 
Thirdly, MENA states with stronger state capacity can improve their primary education 
performance by efficient educational resource allocation and spending. Scholars have confirmed that 
school quality, indicated by factors such as the pupil-teacher ratio and distance from home to school, 
affects primary school attendance and completion (Kabubo-Mariara & Mwabu, 2007; Onphanhdala, 
2010). Politically capable MENA states are better able to allocate appropriate or even more education 
resources to primary education, and are more willing to invest in school districts that receive relatively 
sparse education resources. Moreover, they can target spending effectively, optimizing the use of 
limited primary education budgets. Such states can train, and then hire, well-qualified teachers, build 
more primary schools and buildings, and replace outdated equipment. Tuition fees for financially 
challenged children can be waived, and free primary education can be provided. 
                                                            
3 Figure A3 in the Appendix shows correlations of FSI and the percentage of child labour (dashed line, UNICEF 
2016) and gender parity index (GPI) in primary schools (percentage, gross) (solid line, World Bank 2018) during 
2006–2014. The two lines clearly indicate that higher FSI scores (i.e., weaker states) correspond with higher 
ratios of child labor and lower GPIs in primary education. 
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Sometimes, primary education resources are disproportionately allocated to the wealthy 
classes and urban areas. This is the exact reason why we offer an explanation of the variations in 
primary education in the MENA region. Education spending can be improperly allocated due to 
bureaucratic inefficiency or corruption, both of which are elements of weak states (Thyne, 2006, p. 
736, emphasis added). This is the case in MENA states, such as Sudan and Yemen. In both 
countries, higher proportions of children from poorer families, children living in rural areas, and girls 
are out of school than children from wealthier families, urban children, and boys, respectively 
(UNICEF, 2014, p. 33). 
Intervening to address this improper or uneven distribution of education resources is precisely 
how state capacity can play a role. For example, in Cyprus, the share of the total government 
education budget expended on primary education is less than 30%, on average (World Bank, 
2018b). Yet primary education in Cyprus is free and compulsory. Law 113(I)/1999 further requires 
the government to take sole responsibility for caring for children with special needs (United Nations 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization[UNESCO], 2012). Cyprus now has among the 
highest primary education performance in the MENA region. 
To conclude, we argue that state capacity can explain the variations in MENA primary 
education for the aforementioned reasons. In the following two sections, we will offer statistical 
support to these arguments. 
 




3.1.1 Dependent variables: Primary school enrolment (net and gross), intake, and dropout rates 
 
We applied net and gross primary school enrolment rates, the intake ratio to grade one of primary 
education, and the dropout rate as the set of dependent variables (Net, Gross, Intake, Dropout). 
These data were released by UNESCO’s UIS.Stat (http://data.uis.unesco.org/) and retrieved from 
EdStats: Education Statistics (EdStats), published by the World Bank (2018a). The reason for 
selecting not only the enrolment rate, but also the intake and dropout rates, was straightforward. 
Goal 2 of the MDGs was not only to “achieve universal primary education” but also to be able to 
“complete a full course of primary schooling” (UN, 2016, p. 24, emphasis added). This indicates that 
the purpose of Goal 2 is twofold: to ensure that all children are able to enter primary school, and 
that they do not leave school before finishing all of their courses. Goal 2 therefore justifies our 
selection of these four primary education indicators.  
By definition, net and gross enrollment rates of primary is the ratio of total enrollment to the 
size of the age group that corresponds to the primary level of education, and the ratios of the 
enrolled school-aged children to the population of the corresponding school age, respectively. 
Intake is the ratio in first grade of primary school of the number of new entrants over the population 
of the official primary entrance age. Dropout is simply the percentage of those who are not enrolled 
in primary school. Definitions of Gross and Intake make the percentages of both higher than 100 
possible. Finally, data availability of these four variables covers 1971–2014 for all MENA states 
except Western Sahara.4 
 
3.1.2 Independent variable: State capacity 
 
Selecting the state capacity variable is notably challenging. Hanson (in press); Hanson and Sigman 
(2013); Hendrix (2010) discussed 19, 24, and 15 different indicators, respectively. This diversity is 
                                                            
4  We have noted that some scholars are focusing on universal basic skills and learning outcomes (Asadullah 
and Chaudhury 2015; Hanushek and Woessmann 2015), like the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development’s Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA). However, we still consider that the 
choice of the four indictors in this paper are superior in terms of coverage and meeting Goal 2 of MDGs. 
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indicative of the productiveness of analyses of state capacity, but also highlights the difficulty in 
selecting appropriate indicators. 
Of the available indicators, we selected revenue collection capability as a proxy for state 
capacity. Revenue collection capability is appropriate for a combination of reasons. First, revenue 
collection capability has been widely accepted by scholars as indicative of the ability to penetrate 
society. Many articles we reviewed in Section 2 apply this indicator. Soifer (2012, p. 590) concluded 
that “[m]ost common, however, are various measures of the state’s ability to extract revenue-
scholars use many different operationalizations of the state’s extractive power as measures of 
overall capacity.” Herbst (2000, p. 113) argued that “There is no better measure of a state’s reach 
than its ability to collect taxes. If a state does not effectively control a territory, it certainly will not be 
able to collect taxes in a sustained and efficient manner.” The second criterion is data availability. 
Revenue capability datasets cover a longer period than that investigated in our study. Indicators 
that are repeatedly applied by scholars may be more reliable. Following established practices also 
helps us to avoid selection bias.5 
Based on these criteria, we decided to apply Relative Political Capacity (RPC) as a state 
capacity indicator in our article (Kugler & Tammen, 2012; Arbetman-Rabinowitz et al., 2013). RPC 
is composed of three indicators: relative political extraction (RPE), relative political allocation (RPA), 
and relative political reach (RPR). RPR denotes the ability of the government to mobilize people, 
and RPA indicates the prioritization of government expenditure on public goods. However, only 
RPE is appropriate for taxation capability. RPE is the ratio of actual fiscal revenues obtained by the 
government to those predicted:  RPE =   ，  
where i denotes states. If the ratio is higher than 1, the government is considered politically 
capable; otherwise, it is politically weak (Kugler & Arbetman, 1997, p. 22–23).6 We anticipate that 
the higher the RPE score a MENA state receives, the higher its primary school enrolment and 
intake rates are, and the lower its dropout rates are. 
 
3.1.3 Control variables 
 
We also included a set of control variables in the model. We focused more on macro-level 
indicators, such as social and economic explanations, than micro-level indicators, such as 
household or school characteristics. 
For this reason, and on the basis of the articles we reviewed (Ansell, 2008; Avelino, Brown, & 
Hunter, 2005; Brown & Hunter, 2004; Stasavage, 2005), we applied the following variables as 
controls: democracy, GDP per capita, trade openness, children aged 0-14 (as a percentage of the 
population), pupil-teacher ratio, total population, urbanization (as a percentage of the population), 
civil conflicts, and fuel exports (as a percentage of merchandise exports). All variables, unless 
specified, were obtained from the World Bank (2018b).  
Research indicates that democratic and newly democratized states are willing to spend more on 
primary education than other education levels (Ansell, 2008; Brown & Hunter, 2004; Lake & Baum, 
2001; Stasavage, 2005). We tested whether variations in political performance determine primary 
school enrolment, intake, and dropout rates across MENA entities. Thus, we utilized the polity2 score 
from the Polity IV project (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2016), in which every state is scored annually on 
a -10 to +10 ordinal scale: -10 denotes the least democratic and +10 the most. We test if higher levels 
of democracy are positively or negatively associated with improved primary education. 
                                                            
5 Some may raise the question of taxation capability indicator is not appropriate since oil-rich Arab States do not 
collect tax. This is misleading. With only an exception, Bahrain, most MENA states still collect tax from either 
individuals or companies, or both. See Table A2 in Supplementary Appendix for further information about the 
average income and corporate tax rates between 2006 and 2014 for all available MENA states. 
6 This version of RPE covers 1970–2013 and does not include Western Sahara, West Bank and Gaza, and 
South Sudan, thereby reducing the number of MENA states from 26 to 23.  
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A set of two economic variables was included. First, GDP per capita (current US$) tested if 
different levels of economic wealth shape primary school attainment and dropout rates. We applied 
the natural logarithm of GDP per capita (ln GDP PC). The second economic variable was Trade 
Openness, measured as a percentage of GDP. We expect that if a MENA state is more open 
economically to the world, its primary education is better. The two demographic variables were 
Urbanization, which was measured as urban population as a percentage of total population, and the 
natural log of total population (ln Pop). 
Furthermore, the two school characteristics were children aged 0-14 as a percentage of the 
total population (Children < 15), and the pupil-teacher ratio in primary schools (PT Ratio). We also 
control another variable relative to conflict since war could destroy schools and make it harder for 
children to attend schools (Blattman & Miguekl, 2010; Lai & Thyne, 2007). We create a variable of 
civil war which is coded as 1 when civil war(s) occurs or continues in the given year, otherwise is 0. 
We retrieved data from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, version 18.1 (Eck, Kristin, & 
Pettersson, 2018; Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, & Strand, 2002), and solely carried 
the types of civil war and internationalized civil war. 
Petroleum has long dominated the economic structure of the MENA region. We speculated 
that it may also affect human capital formation by influencing primary education. Descriptive 
statistics of all the variables are available in Table A4 of the Appendix. 
Finally, it should be notified that not every political entity within the MENA region had yearly 
data and some of them even did not report data at all (such as Western Sahara). Moreover, some 
states did not report value until they became independent, such as Djibouti (1977) or South Sudan 
(2011). Thus, though 26 MENA political entities and 44 years of investigation suggest 1,144 
observations, the actual number is indeed lower.  
 
3.2 Model specification 
 
We examined primary school enrolment, intake, and dropout rates for 26 MENA states and political 
entities for 1971–2014. Therefore, the data structure is a time-series, and is cross-country in nature. 
We selected a time-series cross-section model with fixed effects (FE). We applied the Hausman 
test to reach the conclusion that the FE model is more suitable than the random effects (RE) model 
in this paper (The results of the Hausman test is reported in the Table A3 of the Appendix).  
Moreover, we believe that the variable not covered in the right-hand side of the equation is country-
specific. Thus, the FE model is merited here.  
However, the recent evidence argues that in testing the TSCS data, the RE model outperforms 
the FE one for a variety of reasons. These reasons include the former allows us to model variables 
“measured at the higher level” (Bell & Jones, 2015, p. 135–136), is better in controlling for omitted 
variables that are different across states but constant over time, and allows us to test the effects of 
(nearly) consistent variables, such as Democracy in this paper, on our outcome variables. Thus, 
presenting results from both models prevents us from model selection bias.  
To avoid reverse causality and the endogeneity issue, we also set all independent and control 
variables to a one-year lag.7 The default model is based on that of Baltagi (2008, p. 13): 𝑦 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑅𝑃𝐸 + 𝛾𝐶 + 𝑢 ,  
where i denotes all MENA states, t denotes time, and 𝐶 stands for all control variables applied 
in this paper. Furthermore, 𝑢 = 𝜇 + 𝜈 , that 𝜇  is unobservable individual effects and 𝜈  is the 
remainder disturbance. The only difference between the FE and RE models is in the FE model, 𝜇  
is assumed fixed and in the RE model it is assumed to be random in order to avoid “the loss of 
degrees of freedom” Baltagi (2008, p. 17). Yet, all explanatory and control variables are 
independent of 𝜇  and 𝜈 . Finally, we also consider the first-order autoregressive AR(1) process8 
                                                            
7 We also test to see if significant difference exists across units (in other words, no panel effect). If the answer is no, 
then the ordinary least squares (OLS) model is more suitable than the RE model. The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange 
multiplier (LM) test shows there is significant difference across units, so the RE model is our default model. 
8 Our model failed to pass the test of serial correlation by Wooldridge. Thus, the AR(1) process is incorporated.  
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and accommodate unbalanced panels and unequally spaced data. We conducted the locally best 
invariant LBI (Baltagi & Wu, 1999) test and calculated the Durbin-Watson statistic for 
autocorrelation (Bhargava, Franzini, & Narendranathan, 1982). 
 
4. Statistical Results and Discussion 
 
Our statistical results are seen in Tables 1 (FE model) and 2 (RE model). First, our main 
independent variable, RPE, has the expected effects on all four dependent variables. All 
coefficients of RPE are significant statistically at least at the 99% confidence level, holding all other 
variables constant. First, when we look at the gross enrolment rate, a unit increase in RPE can lead 
to a 4.002% increase, if primary schools enroll overaged and/or under-aged children. This figure 
slightly increases to 4.005% when we look at Net, if a MENA state’s RPE is one unit stronger. The 
impact of RPE on Intake reaches statistical significance at the 99% confidence level, and a unit 
increase in RPE is associated positively with a 8.436% increase in Intake, holding all other 
variables constant. Finally, Dropout is negatively associated with stronger RPE, leading to a 
4.555% lower rate if an MENA state can strengthen its RPE by one unit. All of these results 
demonstrate that a stronger state in terms of the extractive capacity is better able to have more 
children enrolled in primary schools, and have fewer of them left schools. Furthermore, these 
empirical results strongly support our argument that the strength of state capacity can explain 
variations in primary school attendance and dropout rates in the MENA region. 
We now direct our attention to the control variables. The first variable, Democracy, is 
positively associated with Gross, Net, and Intake and negatively associated with Dropout. These 
results fit our initial expectation. Though the overall MENA region has few democracies and limited 
democratic experience, countries with democratic practice can do better in promoting primary 
education than their autocratic counterparts. 
The results of ln GDP PC also suggest a positive relationship between the level of economic 
wellbeing and primary education by reaching statistical significance at a 95% confidence level and 
higher. This demonstrates that when personal income (logged) is improved by one unit, Gross, Net 
and Intake increase by 4.457%, 2.517%, and 5.054%, respectively, when all other variables are held 
constant. Furthermore, students are also prevented from leaving school, with Dropout being reduced 
by 2.264% when GDP per capita (logged) is one unit higher, holding all other variables intact.9 
The second economic variable, Trade Openness, somewhat has negative effects on primary 
school indicators and all but Model 3 reach statistical significance. This indicates that globalization, 
in terms of increased economic exchanges, has negative effect on primary education in the MENA 
region. Thus, a further investigation may be required to clarify the relationship between Trade 
Openness and primary schooling. 
All coefficient signs of two demographic variables, Urbanization and ln Pop, have positive 
signs across all four outcome variables. In addition, only one of them (ln Pop in Model 2) attains 
statistical significance at the 99% confidence level. The implications here are that a larger 
population size and higher degree of urbanization help promote Net, Gross, and Intake and reduce 
Dropout percentages, holding all other variables constant. 
Civil War, however, reaches mixed results and none of these results is significantly different 
from 0. This contradicts our expectation and previous findings that domestic instability does harm to 
primary education. A further investigation of the relationship between civil war and education is 
merited.  
The first school-related characteristic, PT Ratio, is positively associated with primary 
education indicators over. Thus, with all other variables constant, teaching one more child per class 
leads to a 0.555% increase in Net, 0.610% increase in Gross, and 0.891% increase in Intake, but a 
0.561% decrease in Dropout. These results imply that, at least in the MENA region, a larger class 
size is beneficial to enrolling primary school-aged students and keeping them in school. 
                                                            
9 Additionally, GDP per head has been applied by some scholars as an alternative indicator of state capacity, 
such as by Fearon and Laitin (2003); Lacina (2006). 
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Furthermore, a higher proportion of children aged 0–14 (Children < 15) was found to have mostly 
detrimental effects on primary schooling indicators examined in the paper. However, only one of 
them attained statistical significance at the 95% confidence level. This may be the result of the 
“youth bulge” in the MENA region–in other words, the growth of the young population has not been 
accompanied by an adequate expansion of educational institutions (World Bank, 2014). 
Finally, Fuel had somewhat pessimistic signs toward primary schooling. Though most results are 
statistically insignificant, Fuel as a proportion of merchandize exports has negative impacts on 
promoting enrollment and intake rates, and on preventing dropout. These findings are consistent with 
the “natural resource curse” theory (Sachs & Warner, 1995, 2001), that countries with abundant 
natural resource endowments tend to exhibit lower performance in social, economic, and political 
development (Deacon, 2011; Ross, 2015). Though the signs of coefficients across the four models 
generally show a pessimistic signal, all four results fail to reach statistical significance. This means 
human capital formation in the form of primary schooling is possible even if countries are oil-rich.  
Statistical results from the RE model in Table 2 are largely consistent with what we found in 
Table 1. For example, a unit increase in RPE, holding all else constant, is positively associated with 
a 3.210%, 2.808%, 2.751% increase in Gross, Net and Intake rates, respectively, and negatively 
associated with a 3.487% decrease in Dropout rates. Similarly, a more democratic regime has 
positive impact on all four education indicators, though now results are statistically insignificant. 
Moreover, two economic indicators have generally similar results as with Table 2, except for 
Openness in Model 7. This similarity can also be witnessed when we pay attention to two 
demographic variables, that Population size and the degree of urbanization are positively 
associated with better education performance in the MENA region. While the results for the PT 
ratio, and Fuel provided further support for the discussion of the link of these two variables and 
education, it is still unclear how civil war generally promotes education performance. Results for 
Children under 15 as a percentage of total population still remained mixed.  
 
Table 1: State Capacity (RPE) and Primary Schooling in MENA, 1971-2014 (FE Model) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Gross Net Intake Dropout 
RPE 4.002*** 4.005*** 8.436** -4.555*** 
 (3.76) (3.94) (3.31) (-4.55) 
Democracy 0.172 0.0940 0.666* -0.114 
 (1.62) (0.73) (2.45) (-0.89) 
ln GDP PC 4.457*** 2.517* 5.054* -2.264* 
 (4.21) (2.40) (2.40) (-2.19) 
Trade Openness -0.0469* -0.0496** -0.0389 0.0445* 
 (-2.48) (-2.62) (-0.92) (2.39) 
Civil War 1.159 0.355 -2.108 -0.407 
 (1.66) (0.53) (-1.36) (-0.62) 
ln Pop 2.352 4.000** 2.232 0.420 
 (1.39) (2.90) (1.35) (0.31) 
Urbanization 0.258 0.0269 0.297 0.130 
 (0.82) (0.11) (1.23) (0.52) 
PT Ratio 0.109 0.212 -0.208 -0.147 
 (0.94) (1.44) (-0.70) (-1.01) 
Children < 15 0.0671 -0.175 -0.0874 0.466 
 (0.24) (-0.63) (-0.27) (1.69) 
Fuel -0.0439* -0.0173 -0.0108 0.0273 
 (-1.99) (-0.81) (-0.22) (1.30) 
Constant 10.20*** 11.64*** 5.669*** -7.038*** 
 (22.41) (27.38) (4.50) (-16.83) 
Observations 









Wald 𝜒  18.41*** 19.79*** 31.70*** 4.32*** 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table 2: State Capacity (RPE) and Primary Schooling in MENA, 1971-2014 (RE Model) 
 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Gross Net Intake Dropout 
RPE 3.210** 2.808** 2.751 -3.487*** 
 (2.92) (2.72) (1.19) (-3.41) 
Democracy 0.112 0.0921 0.388 -0.0943 
 (1.06) (0.77) (1.76) (-0.79) 
ln GDP PC 4.641*** 3.172** 4.142* -3.041** 
 (4.54) (3.15) (2.20) (-3.04) 
Trade Openness -0.0386* -0.0518** 0.00116 0.0459* 
 (-2.02) (-2.75) (0.03) (2.46) 
Civil War 0.939 0.305 -3.464* -0.305 
 (1.29) (0.45) (-2.28) (-0.45) 
ln Pop 5.341*** 3.730* 5.149*** -3.962** 
 (3.38) (2.54) (3.31) (-2.66) 
Urbanization 0.505*** 0.417** 0.0765 -0.419** 
 (3.81) (3.17) (0.48) (-3.17) 
PT Ratio 0.247* 0.198 0.0825 -0.160 
 (2.14) (1.47) (0.34) (-1.20) 
Children < 15 0.0220 -0.333 -0.324 0.433* 
 (0.10) (-1.65) (-1.21) (2.14) 
Fuel -0.0424 -0.0193 -0.0101 0.0221 
 (-1.94) (-0.94) (-0.26) (1.07) 
Constant -64.71* -19.60 -15.93 117.9*** 
 (-1.99) (-0.62) (-0.39) (3.70) 
Observations 









Wald 𝜒  111.03*** 93.25*** 57.32*** 106.49*** 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
To avoid selection bias and test different versions of state capacity (Hanson, in press; Hanson & 
Sigman, 2013; Hendrix, 2010), we also conducted several robustness checks by replacing our main 
explanatory variables with three alternative indicators, namely, ICRG’s Quality of government 
(1985-2014), Linzer and Staton (2015a, 2015b)’s Judicial Independence Index (JII, 1971-2013), 
and Mousseau (2017)’s Contract Intensity of National Economies (CINE, 1971-2011). Statistical 
results still hold after we conducted robustness checks. Due to page limits, this section is presented 
in the Appendix (Section A2). We briefly explain each in turn.  
The first dataset can been seen as the degree to which a government can combat corruption, 
maintain social order and the rule of law, and have a good quality of bureaucracy. This indicator is 
with a range of 0—1, that higher values denotes better government quality. Data were retrieved 
from Teorell et al. (2018) and covers the period of 1985-2014.  
Second, judicial independence, the second alternative indicator of state capacity, is an 
essential part of the rule of law, which upholds state function by protecting personal rights and 
impartially enforcing laws and regulations. As Boies (2006, p. 57, p. 58) highlights: 
 
The rule of law … provides that the rule applied to a particular case must be reasonably predictable. 
And it provides that the rule must be predictable without regard for the identity of the parties. … 
Judicial independence … reduces the likelihood that basic legal protections will fall victim to the 
passions of the moment.” 
 
Finally, the CINE dataset measures the intensity of contract enforcement. In a contract-
intensive entity, the people value the enforcement of contracts seriously, and the government takes 
responsibility for enforcing contracts and punishing those who do not honor contracts (Mousseau, 
2009, 2012). In other words, the degree to which a government can punish those who break 
contracts or fail to honor contracts may indicate how well the government can attain certain policy 
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goals. Therefore, the application of CINE should be appropriate. All of these three indicators are 
continuous, and higher values denote stronger state capacity.10 
We now turn to the results of the robustness checks (Tables A5—A10), and discuss only the 
results for state capacity indicators. In the first four columns of Table A5, higher JII is positively 
associated with better education performance. Though the results became mixed when we applied 
the RE model in Table A6, none of these four models are statistically significant. Consistent and 
robust results are found for ICRG (Tables A7 and A8). Holding all other variables constant, for 
example, a unit increase in ICRG leads to a 30.82% increase in the intake rate, or a 19.59% 
decrease in dropout rate at the error level of 0.001, respectively. Finally, if a MENA state is abler to 
enforce a contract (the contract intensity indicator), then it displays better performance at promoting 
gross and net enrolment and intake rates, and can prevent school-aged children from leaving 
school.  
In short, by using different state capacity indicators, we can still confirm a positive relationship 
between state capacity and primary schooling in the MENA region. This lends substantial support to 




This study aimed to explain variations in primary school attendance, intake, and dropout rates in the 
MENA region from 1971 to 2014 by applying state capacity as explanation. A MENA state with 
stronger state capacity can better reach its population, eliminate possible forces unfavorable to 
primary education, and utilize education resources. Empirical findings support our argument. In the 
next two paragraphs, we present policy implications and directions for future research. 
First, primary education can be improved by strengthening the state capacity. This can be a 
challenging task, because if a state is politically incapable, then it may face additional domestic 
problems that further weaken its ability. However, consolidating a state’s capability is the task that 
each political leader must undertake. We have demonstrated that, despite the homogeneity of the 
economic, political, and religious characteristics of the MENA region, states nevertheless 
demonstrate variations in primary school enrolment, intake, and dropout rates. However, all these 
indicators can be appropriately strengthened, or reduced, if the MENA state is politically capable. 
Finally, further discussion of state capacity and education is merited. The applicability of the 
preceding arguments to Sub-Saharan Africa, where all 48 states (if Sudan and South Sudan are 
included) demonstrate higher variations in political, social, economic, and religious practices, could 
be investigated. We could also examine whether the arguments are applicable to higher levels of 
education. This is a challenging and worthwhile task that we believe political scientists and 




Ansell, B. W. (2008). Traders, Teachers, and Tyrants: Democracy, Globalization, and Public Investment in 
Education. International Organization, 62(2), 289–322. doi:10.1017/S0020818308080107 
Arbetman, M., & Kugler, J. (Eds.) (1997). Political Capacity and Economic Behavior. Boulder, CO: The 
Westview Press. 
Arbetman-Rabinowitz, M., Fisunoglu, A., Kugler, J., Abdollahian, M., Johnson K., Kang, K., & Yang, Z. (2013). 
Replication Data for: Relative Political Capacity Dataset. (Harvard Dataverse, Version 4) [Data file and 
code book]. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/16845 
Asadullah, M. N., & Chaudhury, N. (2015). The Dissonance between Schooling and Learning: Evidence from 
Rural Bangladesh. Comparative Education Review, 59(3), 447–472. doi:10.1086/681929 
Assaad, R., Salehi-Isfahani, D., & Hendy, R. (2015). Inequality of Opportunity in Educational Attainment in 
Middle East and North Africa: Evidence from Household Surveys. Working Paper, 834. 
 
 
                                                            
10 Summary statistics for these three indicators are presented in Table A4 in the Appendix. 
E-ISSN 2240-0524 
ISSN 2239-978X 
Journal of Educational and  
Social Research 
                             Vol 9 No 3 
                     September 2019 
 
 50 
Avelino, G., Brown, D. S., & Hunter, W. (2005). The Effects of Capital Mobility, Trade Openness, and 
Democracy on Social Spending in Latin America, 1980–1999. American Journal of Political Science, 
49(3), 625–641. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2005.00146.x 
Baltagi, B. H. (2008). Econometric Analysis of Panel Data. 4th ed. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons. 
Baltagi, B. H., & Wu, P. X. (1999). Unequally Spaced Panel Data Regressions with AR(1) Disturbances. 
Econometric Theory, 15(6), 814–823. doi:10.1017/S0266466699156020 
Bell, A., & Jones, K. (2015). Explaining Fixed Effects: Random Effects Modeling of Time-Series Cross-Sectional 
and Panel Data. Political Science Research and Methods, 3(1), 133–153. doi:10.1017/psrm.2014.7 
Benson, M., & Kugler, J. (1998). Power Parity, Democracy, and the Severity of Internal Violence. Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, 42(2), 196–209. doi:10.1177/0022002798042002004 
Bhargava, A., Franzini, L., & Narendranathan, W. (1982). Serial Correlation and the Fixed Effects Model. The 
Review of Economic Studies, 49(4), 533–549. doi:10.2307/2297285 
Blattman, C., & Miguel, E. (2010). Civil War. Journal of Economic Literature, 48(1), 3-57. doi:10.1257/jel.48.1.3 
Bockstette, V., Chanda, A., & Putterman, L. (2002). States and Markets: The Advantage of an Early Start. 
Journal of Economic Growth, 7(4), 347–369. doi:10.1023/A:1020827801137 
Boies, D. (2006). Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law. Washington University Journal of Law & Policy, 
22, 57–70. 
Boissiere, M. X. (2004). Determinants of Primary Education Outcomes in Developing Countries. Operations 
Evaluation Department (OED) Working Paper Series, 39157.  
Boussalis, C., Nelson, H. T., & Swaminathan, S. (2012). Towards Comprehensive Malaria Planning: The Effect 
of Government Capacity, Health Policy, and Land Use Variables on Malaria Incidence in India. Social 
Science & Medicine, 75(7), 1213–1221. doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2012.05.023 
Brown, D. S., & Hunter, W. (2004). Democracy and Human Capital Formation: Education Spending in Latin 
America, 1980 to 1997. Comparative Political Studies, 37(7), 842–864. doi:10.1177/0010414004266870 
Cao, X., & Ward, H. (2015). Winning Coalition Size, State Capacity, and Time Horizons: An Application of 
Modified Selectorate Theory to Environmental Public Goods Provision. International Studies Quarterly, 
59(2), 264–279. doi:10.1111/isqu.12163 
Chaudhary, L. (2009). Determinants of Primary Schooling in British India. Journal of Economic History, 69(1), 
269–302. doi:10.1017/S0022050709000400 
Central Intelligence Agency(CIA) The World Factbook. (2016). Middle East and North Africa: Religious Affiliation 
by Country. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency. Retrieved from 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/graphics/religion/middle-eastreligion-
graphic.pdf 
Clark, T. S., & Linzer, D. A. (2014). Should I Use Fixed or Random Effects? Political Science Research and 
Methods, 3(2), 399–408. doi:10.1017/psrm.2014.32 
d’Aiglepierre, R., & Wagner, L. (2013). Aid and Universal Primary Education. Economics of Education Review, 
37, 95–112. doi:10.1016/j.econedurev.2013.09.001 
de Soysa, I., & Fjelde, H. (2010). Is the Hidden Hand an Iron Fist? Capitalism and Civil Peace, 1970–2005. 
Journal of Peace Research, 47(3), 287–298. doi:10.1177/0022343310362167 
Deacon, R. (2011). The Political Economy of the Natural Resources Curse: A Survey of Theory and Evidence. 
Foundations and Trends® in Microeconomics, 7(2), 111–208. doi:10.1561/0700000042 
Dreher, A., Nunnenkamp, P., & Thiele, R. (2008). Does Aid for Education Educate Children? Evidence from 
Panel Data. World Bank Economic Review, 22(2), 291–314. doi:10.1093/wber/lhn003  
Eck, K., & Pettersson, T. (2018). Organized Violence, 1989-2017, and the Data Generation Process. Journal of 
Peace Research, 55(4), 535-547. doi:10.1177/0022343318784101 
El-Sanabary, N. (1989). Determinants of Women’s Education in the Middle East and North Africa: Illustrations 
from Seven Countries. Working Paper, 8567.  
Europa Publications. (Various years). The Middle East and North Africa. Florence, KY: Taylor & Francis Group. 
Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. D. (2003). Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. American Political Science Review, 
97(1), 75–90. doi:10.1017/S0003055403000534 
Feng, Y., & Chen, B. (1997). Political Capacity and Private Investment. In M. Arbetman and J. Kugler (Eds.) 
Political Capacity and Economic Behavior Boulder (pp. 97–108). CO: The Westview Press. 
Freedom House. (2017). Freedom in the World 2017 Populists and Autocrats: The Dual Threat to Global 
Democracy. Washington, DC: Freedom House. 
Giddens, A. (2011). The Politics of Climate Change. 2nd ed. Malden, MA: The Polity Press.  
Gizelis, T. I. (2009). Wealth Alone Does Not Buy Health: Political Capacity, Democracy, and the Spread of 
AIDS. Political Geography, 28(2), 121 – 131. doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2009.01.005 
Gleditsch, N. P., Wallensteen, P., Eriksson, M., Sollenberg, M., & Strand, H. (2002). Armed Conflict 1946-2001: 





Journal of Educational and  
Social Research 
                             Vol 9 No 3 
                     September 2019 
 
 51 
Glewwe, P. (1996). The Relevance of Standard Estimates of Rates of Return to Schooling for Education Policy: 
A Critical Assessment. Journal of Development Economics, 51(2), 267–290. doi:10.1016/S0304-
3878(96)00415-4 
Glewwe, P. W., Hanushek, E. A., Humpage, S. D., & Ravina R. (2011). School Resources and Educational 
Outcomes in Developing Countries: A Review of the Literature from 1990 to 2010. Working Paper, 17554. 
Grigoli, F., & Sbrana, G. (2013). Determinants and Dynamics of Schooling and Child Labour in Bolivia. Bulletin 
of Economic Research, 65(Supplement S1), s17–s37. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8586.2012.00462.x 
Hanson, J. K. (2015). Democracy and State Capacity: Complements or Substitutes? Studies in Comparative 
International Development, 50(3), 304–330. doi:10.1007/s12116-014-9173-z 
Hanson, J. K. (in press). State Capacity and the Resilience of Electoral Authoritarianism: Conceptualizing and 
Measuring the Institutional Underpinnings of Autocratic Power. International Political Science Review. 
Retrieved from http://www-personal.umich.edu/jkhanson/resources/hanson18.pdf 
Hanson, J. K., & Sigman R. (2013). Leviathan’s Latent Dimensions: Measuring State Capacity for Comparative 
Political Research. World Bank Political Economy Brown Bag Lunch Series, March 21, 2013.  
Hanushek, E. A., & Woessmann, L. (2015). Universal Basic Skills: What Countries Stand to Gain. Paris, France: 
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD). 
Hendrix, C. S. (2010). Measuring State Capacity: Theoretical and Empirical Implications for the Study of Civil 
Conflict. Journal of Peace Research, 47(3), 273–285. doi:10.1177/0022343310361838 
Herbst, J. (2000). States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control. Princeton, NJ:    
Princeton University Press.  
Horowitz, L. (2009). Getting Good Government for Women: A Literature Review. Agriculture and Rural  
Development Discussion Paper 43. Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
Htun, M., & Weldon, S. L. (2010). When Do Governments Promote Women's Rights? A Framework for the 
Comparative Analysis of Sex Equality Policy. Perspectives on Politics, 8(1), 207-216. 
doi:10.1017/S1537592709992787 
Human Rights Watch. (2012, May 6). Kuwait: Court Victory for Women’s Rights. [Online forum comment] 
Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/05/06/kuwait-court-victory-womens-rights 
International Labour Organization (ILO). (2013). Marking Progress against Child Labour - Global Estimates and 
Trends 2000–2012. Geneva, Switzerland: International Labour Office, International Programme on the 
Elimination of Child Labour, International Labour Organization. 
International Labour Organization (ILO). (2016). Countries Dashboard. Geneva, Switzerland: International 
Labour Organization.  
Kabubo-Mariara, J., & Mwabu, D. K. (2007). Determinants of School Enrolment and Education Attainment: 
Empirical Evidence from Kenya. South African Journal of Economics, 75(3), 572–593. doi:10.1111/j.1813-
6982.2007.00138.x 
Kelly, S. (2010). Hard-won Progress and a Long Road Ahead: Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North 
Africa. In S. Kelly & J. Breslin (Eds.), Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North Africa (pp. 1–21). New 
York, NY: Freedom House. 
Kelly, S., & Breslin, J. (Eds.). (2010). Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North Africa. New York, NY: 
Freedom House.  
Knutsen, C. H. (2013). Democracy, State Capacity, and Economic Growth. World Development, 43, 1–18. 
doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2012.10.014 
Kugler, J., & Arbetman, M. (1997). Relative Political Capacity: Political Extraction and Political Reach. In M. 
Arbetman & J. Kugler. (Eds.), Political Capacity and Economic Behavior (pp. 11–45). Boulder, CO: The 
Westview Press. 
Kugler, J., & Tammen, R. L. (Eds.). (2012). The Performance of Nations. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Lacina, B. (2006). Explaining the Severity of Civil Wars. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 50(2), 276–289. 
doi:10.1177/0022002705284828 
Lai, B., & Thyne, C. (2007). The Effect of Civil War on Education, 1980-97. Journal of Peace Research, 44(3), 
277-292. doi:10.1177/0022343307076631 
Lake, D. A., & Baum, M. A. (2001). The Invisible Hand of Democracy: Political Control and the Provision of 
Public Services. Comparative Political Studies, 34(6), 587–621. doi:10.1177/0010414001034006001 
Leblang, D. (1997). Political Capacity and Economic Growth. In M. Arbetman & J. Kugler (Eds.), Political 
Capacity and Economic Behavior (pp. 109–125). Boulder, CO: The Westview Press. 
Lin, T.H. (2015). Governing Natural Disasters: State Capacity, Democracy, and Human Vulnerability. Social 
Forces, 93(3), 1267–1300. doi:10.1093/sf/sou104 
Linzer, D. A., & Staton, J. K. (2015a). A Global Measure of Judicial Independence, 1948–2012. Journal of Law 
and Courts, 3(2), 223–256. doi:10.1086/682150 
Linzer, D. A., & Staton, J. K. (2015b). Replication Data for: A Global Measure of Judicial Independence, 1948–




Journal of Educational and  
Social Research 
                             Vol 9 No 3 
                     September 2019 
 
 52 
Maoz, Z., & Henderson, E. A. (2013). The World Religion Dataset, 1945–2010: Logic, Estimates, and Trends. 
International Interactions, 39(3), 265–291. doi:10.1080/03050629.2013.782306 
Marshall, M. G., Gurr, T. R., & Jaggers, K. (2016). POLITY IV PROJECT: Political Regime Characteristics and 
Transitions, 1800–2015. Vienna, VA: Center for Systemic Peace. Retrieved from 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2015.pdf 
Messner, J. J., Haken, N., Taft, P., Blyth, H., Lawrence K., Bellm, C., …Rosenberg L. (2016). Fragile States 
Index 2016 [Data file and code book]. Washington, DC: The Fund for Peace. Retrieved from 
http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/ 
Mok, K. H. (2007). Globalisation, New Education Governance and State Capacity in East Asia. Globalisation, 
Societies and Education, 5(1), 1–21. doi:10.1080/14767720601133009 
Mousseau, M. (2009). The Social Market Roots of Democratic Peace. International Security, 33(4), 52–86. 
doi:10.1162/isec.2009.33.4.52 
Mousseau, M. (2012). Capitalist Development and Civil War. International Studies Quarterly, 56(3), 470–483. 
doi:10.2307/23256799 
Mousseau, M. (2017). Contract Intensity of National Economies (CINE), VersionMay-2017 [Data file and code 
book]. Retrieved from http://politicalscience.cos.ucf.edu/people/mousseau-michael/  
Onphanhdala, P. (2010). Revisiting the Determinants of Primary School Enrolment in Lao PDR. Journal of 
International Cooperation Studies, 18(1), 1–19.  
Psacharopoulos, G., & Patrinos, H. A. (2004). Returns to Investment in Education: A Further Update. Education 
Economics, 12(2), 111–134. doi:10.1080/0964529042000239140 
Ross, M. L. (2008). Oil, Islam, and Women. American Political Science Review, 102(1), 107–123. 
doi:10.1017/S0003055408080040 
Ross, M. L. (2012). The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press.  
Ross, M. L. (2015). What Have We Learned about the Resource Curse? Annual Review of Political Science, 
18(1), 239–259. doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-052213-040359 
Sachs, J. D,. & Warner, A. M. (1995). Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth. Working Paper, 
5398. doi: 10.3386/w5398 
Sachs, J. D., & Warner, A. M. (2001). The Curse of Natural Resources. European Economic Review, 45(4-6), 
827–838. doi:10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00125-8 
Soifer, H. D. (2012). Measuring State Capacity in Contemporary Latin America. Revista de Ciencia Política, 
32(3), 585–598. doi:10.4067/S0718-090X2012000300004 
Stasavage, D. (2005). Democracy and Education Spending in Africa. American Journal of Political Science, 
49(2), 343–358. doi:10.1111/j.0092-5853.2005.00127.x 
Thyne, C. L. (2006). ABC’s, 123’s, and the Golden Rule: The Pacifying Effect of Education on Civil War, 1980–
1999. International Studies Quarterly, 50(4), 733–754. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2006.00423.x 
United Nations(UN). (2016). The Millennium Development Goals Report 2015. New York, NY: Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations. 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization(UNESCO). (2012). Cyprus. In International 
Bureau of Education (IBE), United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (Ed.), World 
Data on Education: Seventh Edition 2010–11(Seventh ed.). Retrieved from 
http://www.ibe.unesco.org/en/document/world-data-education-seventh-edition-2010-11 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization(UNESCO). (2016). UIS.Stat [Data file and code 
book]. Retrieved from http://data.uis.unesco.org/ 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees(UNHCR). (2016). Middle East and North Africa. Geneva, 
Switzerland: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Retrieved from 
http://www.unhcr.org/middle-east-and-north-africa.html 
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). (2013). Every Child’s Birth Right: Inequities and Trends in Birth 
Registration. New York: The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). 
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). (2014). Regional Report on Out-of-school Children: Middle East & 
North Africa. Amman, Jordan: UNICEF MENA Regional Office.  
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). (2016). UNICEF Data: Monitoring the Situation of Children and 
Women. [Data file and code book]. Retrieved from http://data.unicef.org/child-protection/child-labour.html 
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). (2016). International Energy Statistics. [Data file and code book]. 
Retrieved from http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/ 
Ward, H., Cao, X., & Mukherjee, B. (2014). State Capacity and the Environmental Investment Gap in 
Authoritarian States. Comparative Political Studies, 47(3), 309–343. doi:10.1177/0010414013509569 
World Bank, The. (2014). Education in the Middle East and North Africa [Abstract]. Retrieved from 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/region/mena/brief/education-in-mena 




Journal of Educational and  
Social Research 
                             Vol 9 No 3 
                     September 2019 
 
 53 
World Bank, The. (2018b). World Development Indicators. [Data file and code book] Retrieved from 
http://data.worldbank.org/products/wdi 
World Bank, The. (2018c). Countries. [Data file and code book] Retrieved from 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country  
World Bank, The. (2018d). Middle East and North Africa. [Data file and code book] Retrieved from 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/region/mena 
Wu, X. (2011). The Household Registration System and Rural-Urban Educational Inequality in Contemporary 
China. Chinese Sociological Review, 44(2), 31–51. doi:10.2753/CSA2162-0555440202 
Wu, X., & Treiman, D. J. (2004). The Household Registration System and Social Stratification in China: 1955–
1996. Demography, 41(2), 363–384. doi:10.1353/dem.2004.0010 
Zhao, M., & Glewwe, P. (2010). What Determines Basic School Attainment in Developing Countries? Evidence 
from Rural China. Economics of Education Review, 29(3), 451–460. 
doi:10.1016/j.econedurev.2009.10.008 
 
